I. Introduction
After several decades of varying degrees of restriction on direct foreign investment (DFI) and direct foreign investment in the financial system in particular (DFIFS), Colombian policymakers decided to allow virtually free entry of DFIFS in the early 1990s.
This decision was taken as a part of a larger process of external and financial sector liberalization, and was aimed at enhancing competition, improving resource allocation, and obtaining greater administrative efficiency in financial institutions.
There is evidence that financial sector opening and the entry of foreign-owned financial institutions may provide significant benefits to a country's financial system.
Analysis of cross-country information has shown how foreign entry tends to lower intermediation spreads and overhead expenses over time, with subsequent benefits for consumers of financial services (Claessens, et.al., 1997) . Case studies of certain individual countries confirm these positive results (Honohan, 1997; Pastor, et.al., 1997) .
A recent study (Barajas, et.al., 1998) that used aggregate data to analyze the determination of intermediation spreads in Colombia found evidence of benefits derived from the liberalization reforms implemented in the early 1990s. Although the average level of spreads did not change significantly when comparing pre and post-liberalization samples, competition appeared to have increased and there was evidence that bank behavior became more prudent as banks increased the sensitivity of their pricing decisions to changes in loan quality. However, this study did not separate different effects of the liberalization, such as increased entry of new foreign and domestic participants, nor did it test whether significant changes in the determinants of spreads had occurred.
In the present study we use a panel data set encompassing both pre and postliberalization periods and set out to separate different effects of the liberalization, testing their significance in explaining changes in intermediation spreads, the level of nonfinancial costs, and the quality of the loan portfolio. In particular, we analyze the behavior of DFIFS in Colombia and examine several hypotheses regarding the difference in behavior of foreign-owned banks as well as the impacts of foreign entry on different types of banks.
The organization of the paper is the following. First, in Section II we chronicle the changes in legislation regarding DFIFS, from relative openness before 1967, to increased restriction culminating in a "Colombianization" of the financial system in 1975, and finally to renewed openness in the 1990s. Second, in Section III we examine several performance indicators during the 1991-1998, focusing on differences between domestic and foreignowned banks on the one hand, and between domestic banks acquired by foreign investors and all other foreign banks, on the other hand. Third, in Section IV we use panel data on individual banks during the 1985-1998 period and set out to test whether significant differences in pricing behavior, administrative costs, and loan quality arise between domestic and foreign owned banks, whether foreign entry has affected the performance of domestic banks, and whether the mode of foreign entry matters (i.e., purchase of existing banks versus the establishment of new foreign-owned banks). Finally, in Section IV we summarize the major conclusions and findings.
II. Institutional and regulatory aspects
We will describe the changes in regulation regarding direct foreign investment in the financial system (DFIFS) within the context of direct foreign investment (DFI) in general, noting that the financial system has always received differential treatment in Colombia, being, until recently, one of the most protected sectors.
From the late 1960s through the 1980s foreign investment in the financial system faced severe legal restrictions. The foreign exchange regime introduced in 1967 (through Decree Law 444) and the overall policy towards foreign investment essentially closed the doors to foreign participation in Colombia´s financial sector, and in the 1980s, as a result of a deep financial crisis the authorities devoted most of their attention to the strengthening of financial institutions rather than liberalzing the system and allowing greater foreign participation. It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that DFIFS was permitted to increase as the foreign exchange regime was liberalized and a financial sector reform was put in place that aimed at enhancing efficiency and competition.
Between 1970 and 1990, the restrictive legal framework led to stagnation in the flows of DFIFS. During the 1970s an explicit purpose of the policies in place was to substitute foreign with domestic capital. The result was that, after being rather volatile at a reasonably high level in the early 1970s, DFIFS practically disappeared in the following ten years, and only recently has regained some momentum (see Table 1 ). As a percentage of total DFI, the flow of DFIFS went from an average of 27. 4% during 1970-1974, to -0.2% in 1986-1989 and to 19.2% between 1990 and 1997 . As a percentage of GDP, the average flow of DFIFS was nil until 1989, and has recently increased, reaching 0.5% of GDP.
In the following section we describe three periods marked by major changes in the regulation regarding DFIFS: i) the period prior to 1967; ii) the period known as that of "Colombianization of the banking system" (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) ; and iii) the liberalization period of the 1990s. 1974 1975-1979 1980-1985 1986-1989 1990-1997 11.63 * Banks with foreign participation are those in which at least 30% of equity is foreign-owned ** Data up to 1996 *** Data up to 1997 *** Data refer to the last year of the sub-period Source: Own calculations based on Asociación Bancaria and Superintendencia Bancaria. Table 2 Indicators of Foreign Investment in Banks (% of total) Table 1 A. Pre-1967: no specific policy regarding foreign capital 2 Historically, Colombian authorities perceived foreign investment as something positive, and therefore it was not restricted at all. This policy fit well within the development model then in place. As overall DFI began to gain importance in key exportintensive sectors, the authorities decided to keep track of new investments, in order to have proper knowledge of the foreign exchange movements that they entailed. Legislation safeguarded the right to remit profits and reimburse capital, while establishing some conditions in order to be able to purchase foreign exchange from the central bank. Until 1967 Colombia had a fixed exhange rate. As a result of export volatility (closely linked to the evolution of coffee prices) and of expansionary policies that weakened the balance of payments, the parity was adjusted on several occasions.
1970-

Foreign Investment in the Colombian Banking System
A critical balance of payments situation emerged in 1966. Following a prolonged dispute with the IMF, and given that the Colombian authorities did not want to implement a massive devaluation, a new foreign exchange and trade regime (through Decree Law 444 of 1967) was adopted, the key element of which was the introduction of stiff foreign exchange controls. The Banco de la República was granted full monopoly over the demand and supply of foreign exchange, and several mechanisms were introduced in order to protect domestic production, promote exports, and control and guide DFI. Regarding exchange rate policy, starting in 1967 a crawling-peg regime was introduced.
This new foreign exchange regime introduced authorization and registration procedures and gave the government the tools to direct foreign investment towards those areas considered a priority for the country's economic development. The National Decision 24, which was partially adopted by Colombia At the time, Colombia was facing very favorable economic conditions: coffee prices were high, nontraditional exports were increasing, savings were on the rise and there was abundant foreign financing. This setting was deemed appropriate to restrict DFI in general, and DFIFS in particular.
The integration of the Andean countries, undertaken within the context of the prevalent import substitution development strategy, was aimed at increasing regional trade.
The agreement called for regional policy harmonization, particularly with regard to exchange rate, monetary, fiscal, trade and foreign investment matters. In reference to the latter, the purpose was to substitute foreign with domestic capital, under the belief that DFI could have adverse balance of payments effects.
Decision 24 was intended to prevent "foreign capital from reaping the benefits of integration, then transferring those benefits overseas" (Garay and Pizano, 1979 According to López (1979) , the events of 1975 are partly explained by the fact that the Pastrana administration had not only excluded the financial sector from Decision 24, it in fact had allowed an unprecedented increase in DFIFS. This was a matter of concern, because of several reasons: i) since businesses mostly financed their investment through borrowing rather than through the capital market, it was thought that it would be inconvenient for the providers of these funds to be foreign institutions, since this would give foreigners undue control over Colombia's means of production; ii) given that foreign institutions mostly intermediated domestic financial resources, Law 75 sought to prevent their reaping the benefits of an enhanced pool of domestic savings achieved in part from the interest rate liberalization undertaken in the early 1970s. This argument was strengthened by the fact that foreign banks loaned funds especially to multinational corporations not involved in those sectors deemed crucial for Colombia´s economic development; iii) while domestic financial institutions were closely supervised, thanks to their transnational structure foreign banks could evade many of the controls.
Since it forced foreign firms to transform into joint ventures and not into fully domestically owned institutions 7 , Law 55 seemed to be less restrictive than Decision 24.
However, it still had a very adverse effect on DFIFS flows, which went from 27.4% to 7.4% of total DFI between 1970-74 and 1975-79 (Table 1 ).
According to the Superintendencia Bancaria (1989) , the "Colombianization law"
did not yield its expected results, particularly in regard to altering the control of institutions.
On the contrary, it had undesired consequences. By forcing foreign intermediaries to transform themselves into joint ventures, institutions went through the transformation 7 A firm was considered domestic if foreign capital was 20% or less of total capital. If this percentage was between 20 and 49, the firm was considered a joint venture.
process without surrendering control, since sales of shares were done in small lots (i.e.
selling the required 51% to a large number of small investors) 8 . Furthermore, once the transformation process was completed, there were no incentives to increase the capital base.
It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that foreign capital was forced to contract, the relative size of jointly owned banks -either in terms of capital or in terms of assets-was not affected. In fact, they grew at a slightly faster pace than domestic banks, only that now they had less foreign capital. As can be seen in tables 1 and 2, even though DFIFS flows fell sharply, in terms of assets the importance of banks with significant amounts of foreign capital actually increased (from 8.8% in 1975-79 to 9.5% in 1980-85) .
Since control of these institutions remained in foreign hands, we may conclude that a higher portion of domestic savings was now being controlled with less foreign capital. In that sense, the policy had perverse effects.
iv) Financial crisis and liberalization attempts (1980-1989)
At the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s, coffee prices collapsed, growth stalled, the fiscal situation worsened and foreign indebtedness reached record levels. Then, as a result of the international debt crisis, access to foreign credit drastically declined.
Simultaneously, Colombia's financial sector entered an unprecedented period of crisis, as a result of (Montenegro, 1983) : i) the economic downturn; ii) sloppy management of financial institutions and corruption; iii) weak and outdated supervision; and iv) lack of prudential norms and requirements.
The economic crisis of the early 1980s underscored the need to supplement the scarce level of domestic savings in order to be able to sustain adequate growth rates. As a consequence, it led to a re-thinking of the policy regarding DFI. Regulations on the subject began changing when Colombia adopted the Andean Pact's Decision 220 ( and, as a result investment flows in this sector continued to fall both in terms of total DFI and as a proportion of GDP (Table 1) .
Starting in 1985, several attempts were made in order to change the laws governing the financial sector (Vesga, 1989) . The focus was not so much on the role of foreign investment, but rather on strengthening the financial system following the crisis of the early 1980s. The most important reforms were the introduction of deposit insurance, the establishment of a guarantee fund, and the re-privatization of those banks that had been nationalized during the crisis.
There were some attempts at liberalizing DFIFS within the financial sector reform.
In particular, some thought that lack of competition was one of the main structural problems faced by Colombia's financial system, and that foreign investment could help achieve a much desired increase in the system's capital base. However, most of these reform initiatives faced stiff opposition in Congress. Once again, there were many who believed that foreign investment would consolidate monopolies and extract rents rather than all of the equity. 9 The most important features in the context of Decision 220 were: i) new foreign investment was allowed in those firms that wanted to increase their capital base (and not only in those in imminent danger of bankruptcy, as under Decision 24); ii) foreign firms were no longer required to transform themselves into domestic or into joint ventures; iii) there would be no limit to foreigner's participation in the equity of a firm; iv) Chapter 3 of Decision 24, dealing with sectors in which DFI was prohibited, was eliminated; and v) the 7% limit to profit reinvestment was also deleted. For details see Gómez and Botero (1987) and Ospina and Kacew (1989) .
promote economic development, and it was believed that in order to enhance the financial system's capital base, the government should take the lead. Finally, it was argued that the 1980s crisis had affected both domestic and foreign institutions.
It should be noted that although joint-ownership banks faced a difficult situation during the crisis years, they generally performed better than domestic banks. Although profitability decreased across the board, in the critical year of 1985 domestic banks did particularly poorly. Their average return on assets was -5%, compared to -2% in the case of the joint ownership banks ( Even though on average joint-ownership banks seemed to have been managed more prudently and therefore were able to weather the crisis, it is still the case that some of these institutions were severely affected during the crisis. Banco Tequendama and Banco del Comercio had to be nationalized in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In addition, exemptions to Andean Pact Decision 24 -allowing for foreigners to own more than 49% of a financian institution if this would prevent it from collapsing-were applied in the case of several banks (Mercantil, Crédito y Comercio, Colombo and Real). 
C. Liberalization of DFIFS (1990-1998)
By the early 1990s Colombia's financial sector still lacked competitiveness, was highly inefficient and severely repressed, and owned to a great extent by the government.
Reserve requirements stood at around 40%, while interest rate spreads surpassed those in developed countries by more than 5 points and those of neighboring economies by more than 1. 11 In 1991 the government owned more than 50% of the assets of the banking system (Table 3) .
A broad market-oriented structural reform program was initiated in 1989-1990 the cornerstone of which was Law 9 of 1991, which introduced a change in the foreign exchange regime, significantly opening the capital account and eliminating the central bank's monopoly over purchases and sales of foreign currency. 12 With regard to the financial sector, the authorities embarked on an ambitious program aimed at redefining the role and structure of the financial sector and introduced major reforms through Law 45 of 1990 and Law 35 of 1993. The most salient features included the simplification of entry and exit of firms; 13 the adoption of an almost universal banking scheme aimed at reducing firm specialization; a reduction of intermediation taxes (including reserve requirements and mandatory investments); the establishment of a tighter prudential regulation; and the reprivatization of those institutions that had been nationalized during the crisis. In the context of the reform, and given the new DFI framework, there was now free entry and exit of foreign investment in the financial sector.
10 In addition, in 1988 Banco Royal Colombiano was purchased by domestic investors. 11 More detailed information can be found in Barajas et al. (1998) . 12 Because of macro stability considerations, capital account liberalization has been reversed on several occasions. Starting in 1993, a non interest-bearing reserve requirement is applied on short-term foreign borrowing. 13 Norms regarding transfers, mergers and divisions were also simplified. million in the areas of public utilities, waste management or oil extraction. DFIFS is also guided by these general principles.
These institutional changes have had a positive effect on DFIFS. As a percentage of overall DFI, it went from -0.2% in 1986-1989 to 19.2% in 1990-1997 (Table 1) , and within the banking system, the share in total assets of banks having foreign investment went from 9.1% in 1986-1989 to 13.2% on average in 1990-1997 (Table 2) . One can also note that foreign banks (joint-ownership banks before 1991) increased their participation both in the banking system's capital base and in the generation of employment. On the other hand, the share in assets of government-owned banks has significantly diminished, from 55% of total assets in 1991 to 10.3% in 1998 (Table 3) , while foreign banks went from having 7.6% of total assets in 1991 to having 31.4% in 1998. 15 In conclusion, regulation has certainly affected the evolution of DFIFS. When the DFI regime became severely restricted in the 1970s and 1980s, foreign investment in the financial system all but vanished. However, if one looks at bank ownership, it is quite clear that one of the main goals of Law 55 of 1975 was not achieved, as control of jointownership banks appeared to remain very much in foreign hands. Conceivably, this had some bearing on the fact that these institutions fared somewhat better than domestic ones during the financial crisis of the early 1980s. In the 1990s, with the liberalization of foreign investment, DFIFS became very dynamic, and foreign banks that had been forced to change ownership in the 1970s were re-acquired by foreign investors. In addition, other foreign banks have established branches in Colombia, while two domestic banks of important size were purchased by Spanish investors. Currently, more than 30% of assets in the banking system are owned by foreign investors.
III. Descriptive and Performance Indicators during the 1990s
We proceed to describe some key banking sector indicators for the [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] period, focusing on two key distinctions: (1) between private domestic banks and foreignowned banks, and (2) between former domestic banks acquired by foreign investors and all other foreign banks.
15 It is worth recalling the changes in ownership. Banks that prior to 1975 were foreign and had to transform into joint ventures -including Citibank, Anglo, Andino, Sudameris, Extebandes, of America and Real-once again are fully owned by foreigners. Banco de los Trabajadores and Banco Tequendama, which were nationalized during the crisis, were sold to foreigners. Some foreign banks have recently started operations in Colombia (Bank of Boston, Banco del Pacífico and ABN Amro). In addition, the largest domestic bank and one medium sized bank (Banco Ganadero and Banco Comercial Antioqueño, respectively) were recently purchased by Spanish investors.
A. The Data
In this section we define as foreign-owned those banks in which foreigners own at least 30% of total equity. 16 As was mentioned above, several changes in ownership have taken place in the 1990s. Some of them occurred at the beginning of the period, and others towards the end. In order to simplify the descriptive analysis, we have classified banks as being foreign-owned or domestic depending on which status prevailed during the longest period of time. That being the case, we classify two currently foreign-owned banks (Ganadero and Santander) as domestic since their purchase by foreign investors came about relatively late in the sample period (1997), while we classify as foreign banks two others that were first privatized and sold to foreign interests early on (Mercantil and Tequendama).
17
The frequency of the data is semi-annual, and is based on balance sheets and profit/loss statements obtained from the Colombian Bankers'Association (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) and the Banking Superintendency (1996) (1997) (1998) . Between 1991 and June 1996 monthly data for June and December are used and from December 1996 to June 1998 semi-annual data are used.
B. Domestic vs. foreign-owned banks
The importance of (non interest-bearing) demand deposits has fallen sharply for both types of banks, and foreign-owned banks have consistently lower ratios of demand 16 Banks such as Banco de Colombia, Banco de Bogotá, Banco de Crédito, Banco Intercontinental and Banco Selfin have foreign capital that does not surpass 30% of total capital. 17 In the previous section, and in order to show the recent importance of DFIFS, we did take into account the change of ownership in these banks.
deposits to total deposits (Figure 2) . Consequently, since reserve requirements are higher for demand deposits than for other type of deposits, these institutions have generally been subjected to lower overall reserve requirements. 18 During the 1990-1998 period demand deposits as a percentage of total deposits stood at 48.5% in the case of domestic banks and at 38.5% in the case of foreign-owned institutions (Figure 2.A) , and the average reserve requirement has been 23.4% for the former group, 19.8% for the latter (Figure 2 .B). The less intensive use of demand deposits by foreign-owned banks is also reflected in higher interest payments on deposits (17.9% vs. 15% in the case of domestic banks, Figure 2 .C).
For all three indicators, the differences across the two types of banks appear to be diminshing over time.
Regardless of ownership, Colombian banks show a similar ratio of labor costs to total assets, around 5% ( Higher efficiency and better quality of loans should imply that foreign-owned banks could afford to charge a lower interest rate on loans. As Figure 4 .E. illustrates, at least until 1993 this was not the case. 19 In fact, on average for the 1991-1998 period, they charged a slightly higher rate (38.7%) than their domestically-owned counterparts (35.3%). The intermediation spread (m), as defined in Barajas, et al. (1998) and others that had not (Banco Ganadero and Banco Comercial Antioqueño). As was 
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Domestic Banks already explained, we do not consider the latter two as foreign-owned. Therefore, in this section we limit ourselves to establishing differences between Bancos Tequendama and Mercantil on the one hand (domestic banks acquired by foreigners, or acquired banks), and the rest of foreign-owned banks on the other (i.e., re-acquired previously joint-ownership banks and new foreign banks).
Reserve requirements of the acquired banks have declined significantly (from 30.4% in June 1991 to 15.8% in June 1998, Figure 5 ) while for other foreign-owned banks the indicator has remained stable, at around 19%. This of course reflects changes in the composition of deposits, which in turn has had some bearing on interest rate payments, which, in the case of acquired banks, increased from 12.6% in June 1991 to 21.2% in June 1998. For other foreign-owned banks interest rate payments have remained stable, at close to 18%.
Most other factors affecting the interest rate spread have improved for acquired banks; labor costs have fallen in relation to total assets, the real value assets per employee has increased, the percentage of nonperforming loans has fallen, and the average interest rate charged on loans has declined ( Figure 6 ). In relation to the rest of foreign-owned banks, acquired banks began the decade at a disadvantage but have made up the difference, in some cases outperforming the other group by mid-1998. On average, efficiency, as measured by (the inverse of) labor costs to total assets, was slightly higher than in the case of other foreign-owned banks (on average, 4.7% vs. 4.9%), and productivity and real wages are similar for the two groups. Non-performing loans as a proportion of total loans have declined nearly 7 points in acquired banks but only by 3.5 points in other foreign-owned institutions. Interest rates charged on loans have declined significantly in acquired banks As a result, spreads have declined for both groups (Figure 7 ), more sharply in the case of acquired banks purchased by foreigners; for this group, the average spread was around 6% in 1998, while for For foreign-owned banks spreads were around 20%.
The main conclusion that emerges from this descriptive analysis is that foreignowned banks, regardless of whether they were originally owned by nationals or not, have less non-performing loans, less reserve requirements and are more productive. In spite of this, they do not work with smaller spreads, as they presumably reap the benefits of lack of competition within Colombia's financial system. A second conclusion is that, within the context of foreign-owned banks, those that had previously been government owned have experienced the greatest improvements in most indicators. In recent years this has allowed them to operate with lower spreads than those of other foreign-owned institutions.
IV. Econometric Analysis of Foreign Entry in Colombia's Banking System
In this section we analyze differences across types of banks and the possible impact of foreign entry on three aspects of bank performance: pricing (interest spreads), loan quality, and operative and/or administrative efficiency. Since the major regulatory changes allowing foreign entry in the early 1990s coincided with greater domestic financial liberalization, we also seek to control for these domestic effects. In particular, the 1990s 
A. Panel Data Used
We used semi-annual balance sheet and profit/loss statement data for 32 banks during the 1985(1)-1998(1) period to construct both bank-specific and sector-wide indicators. These banks constitute virtually the entire banking system, with two exceptions:
(1) Two new banks, one domestic (Davivienda) and one foreign-owned (Amro) were not included since they entered too late into the sample and only 2 semi-annual observations were available. However, their information was used to compute sector-wide indicators. (2) One foreign bank (Extebandes) was excluded from the 1991-1998 period due to unresolved problems with its profit/loss statement information, although its balance sheet data was also incorporated in the sector-wide indicators.
Of the 32 banks, 21 remained domestically-owned throughout the sample, and the remaining 11 were foreign (joint-ownership before 1990 and/or completely foreign-owned from 1990 onward) at one time or another. Of the 21 domestic banks, three large ones were state-owned throughout the sample, and the rest were private, of which 6 were new banks created in the 1990s. Among the 11 foreign-owned banks, 2 were the acquired banks described in the previous section, 2 were newly created, and the remaining 7 were the previous joint-ownership banks re-acquired by foreing investors.
i) Bank-specific indicators
For each bank i, we constructed the following indicators of bank pricing, administrative/operational efficiency, loan quality, and market share. For simplicity, the sub-index i is dropped except when necessary to distinguish a bank-specific from a sectorwide variable. 
ii) Sector-wide indicators
We also constructed several sector-wide indicators on structural change and entry were also constructed from the individual bank data:
Following Claessens, et.al. (1997) , two different types of foreign entry variables were constructed, one expressing the number share of foreign banks (NF) and one experiences a discrete increase in size. The evolution of the Colombian banking system throughout our sample period can be seen from an overview of the main sector-wide indicators, in Table 4 . After suffering from the final crisis years in the 1980s, the system experienced a recovery in the 1990s, with growth in assets accelerating from 2 ½ to over 9%, and profitability also increasing from under 1% to 2-3%. Overall concentration has diminished -the Herfindahl index 22 Since it was impossible to disaggregate strictly loan-related commissions in the 1985-1990 information, all commissions received were used. Therefore this definition differs slightly from that used in the previous 1985-1990 1991-1995 1996-1998 
B. Results
We estimated panel data regressions for the intermediation spread (s), the ratio of nonfinancial costs to assets (nfc), and the ratio of nonperforming to total loans (npl). We used three different panels: all 32 banks, foreign banks (those that had been either jointownership of fully foreign-owned at some time during the sample), and domestic banks (those that remained domestically-owned throughout the sample period). In all cases we tested whether explanatory power was enhanced by incorporating bank-specific dummy variables, and once this was verified, whether random effects (RE) or fixed effects (FE) estimation would yield greater efficiency (i.e., the Hausman test). We included in all regressions a set of bank specific indicators, a set of sector-wide indicators, and a set of macroeconomic variables: annual real growth rate of GDP (rgdp), the 12-month inflation rate (INF), and the real deposit interest rate (rint).
(i) Intermediation spreads (s)
Following the bank profit maximization model used in Barajas, et. al. (1998) , we included bank-specific variables reflecting marginal costs in the determination of intermediation spreads. Namely, we expected intermediation spreads to be postively related to the level of taxation of financial intermediation (rr), the level of nonfinancial costs (nfc), and credit risk (i.e., deteriorations in loan quality, npl). We also allowed for the possibility section.
that spreads could differ from marginal costs to the extent that some banks might possess market power or price-setting capability. Therefore, variation in spreads could also result from changes in market power brought on by the remaining explanatory variables: bank market share, the sector-wide characteristics of the banking industry, and the macroeconomic variables.
Among the bank-specific variables, marginal cost effects prove to be significant in explaining intermediation spreads, as Table 5 shows. As the relative size of financial taxation, nonfinancial costs, and nonperforming loans increased, spreads tended to increase, both over time and across banks. Furthermore, sensitivity of spreads to changes in loan quality appeared to increase after 1990, as the interaction term between LIB and npl is positive and significant. This constitutes direct evidence of a finding of which an earlier, aggregate estimation only obtained indirect evidence 23 , thereby supporting the hypothesis that changes in bank reporting and supervision undertaken in the early 1990s have led banks to transfer a greater portion of the cost of increased credit risk to their customers.
Market share, on the other hand does not appear to be related to banks'ability to increase spreads.
The spread equations also include two bank-specific dummy variables, STATE and FOREIGN, which are equal to one in those time periods for which a given bank is stateowned or foreign-owned (defined as joint-ownership up to 1990, foreign-owned thereafter), respectively. Therefore, as some banks over time are privatized and/or purchased by foreign investors, these dummy variables do not necessarily remain constant. In the equations for the entire sample of banks, state-owned banks appear to be able to charge slightly higher Semi-annual data: 1985 Semi-annual data: (1)-1998 (1) t-ratios shown in parentheses; (*) significant at 5%, (**) significant at 10%. spreads, by about 2 ¾ percentage points, possibly by virtue of the fact that they handle a large quantity of non-remunerated demand deposits for the public sector. However, this effect disappears once the sub-sample of domestic banks is taken. Foreign banks, on the other hand, do not appear to have price-setting advantages over domestic banks.
As for sector-wide variables, the liberalization measures undertaken in 1990 appear to have had a positive effect on competition in the banking system, also supporting previous findings from aggregate banking system estimation. 24 Market concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, appears to have had a counterintuitive negative effect on spreads, but this effect is weakened considerably once the subsamples of foreign or domestic banks were taken. Finally, entry of new banks into the system appears to have increased competition, thereby lowering spreads. Furthermore, entry of new domestic banks appears to have had a stronger impact than foreign entry. For both measures (number and market share) and for all three samples of banks, domestic entry was a significant explanatory variable, while foreign entry only appeared to affect spreads of foreign banks;
neither the number nor the market share variables were significant predictors of domestic bank spreads.
Regarding the macroeconomic variables, only the inflation rate was shown to have a significant effect on spreads. Accelerations in the inflation rate,by increase the inflation tax extracted from banks through required reserves, lead to higher marginal intermediation costs, and thus higher spreads. On the other hand, spreads did not appear to have a cyclical component nor did they appear to be affected by the real interest rate.
We also conducted several OLS estimations using group rather than bank-specific dummy variables in order to test whether new banks behaved differently, and whether the acquired foreign banks behaved differently from the rest. The results of these tests are summarized in the bottom panel of Table 5 . 25 The main result is that new banks, both foreign and domestic, were establishing lower spreads than their established counterparts possibly in an effort to gain market share. 26 Banks acquired by foreign investors, on the other hand, did not have spreads that were significantly different from those of other foreign banks, nor did their spreads change significantly as a result of being acquired (as reflected in the dummy variable FOREIGN).
(ii) Nonfinancial costs (nfc)
Our regressions for the level of nonfinancial costs included the real wage rate and market share as bank specific effects, and the set of bank-specific dummy variables, sectorwide indicators, and macroeconomic variables. As illustrated in Table 6 , real wages tended to have a significant positive effect on nonfinancial costs, except in the case of the domestic banks subsample. Supporting earlier aggregate findings, market share appeared to have a significant negative effect, thus indicating the existence of economies of scale and stateowned banks tended to have higher nonfinancial costs 27 . Foreign banks, on the other hand, 24 Using the two distinct sample periods, Barajas, et. al. (1998) found the market power parameter (i.e., the degree of divergence of spreads from marginal costs) for the banking system as a whole to be significant in the pre-liberalization period, and to be non-significant in the post-liberalization period. 25 For simplicity, the full set of estimated parameters is not shown. Since the results are very similar to those obtained in the RE estimations shown, we only report the results of the group dummy variables themselves. 26 It has been shown that, in some cases, easing of entry restrictions was followed by a battle for market share that resulted in a "supracompetitive solution", whereby banks priced their spreads temporarily below marginal costs (see Gruben & McComb (1996) for an illustration of this phenomenon in the Mexican case). However, as Barajas, et. al. (1998) showed, this did not seem to be the case for Colombia in the 1990s. 27 In the Barajas, et. al. (1998) study, the spread equation included a scale variable which was significant and also supported the existence of economies of scale. The descriptive section of the study also showed how state banks had consistently higher nonfinancial costs throughout the sample period. t-ratios shown in parentheses; (*) significant at 5%, (**) significant at 10%. The nonfinancial costs of domestic banks also appeared to contain a cyclical component -as real GDP growth accelerated, costs declined -and tended to increase with accelerations in the rate of inflation. Among groups of banks, the OLS results showed that 28 Only the domestic number entry variable (ND) was significant in explaining nonfinancial costs of foreign banks, and only at a 10% level.
new banks were no different from the rest of banks in either of the subsamples, and acquired banks were no different from established foreign banks. However, acquired banks did experience a slight cost reduction as a result of being acquired by foreign investors.
(ii) Loan quality (npl)
Our regressions for the loan quality variable included the bank-specific lending interest rate as an explanatory variable in order to capture possible adverse selection effects whereby the quality of the loan applicant pool would deteriorate as a result of an increase in the lending rate. As Table 7 shows, this variable was positive and significant in the full panel and in the subsample of domestic banks, thus suggesting that domestic banks are subject to greater adverse selection than their foreign counterparts.
Several results confirmed stylized facts observed in previous descriptive analysis.
State-owned banks tended to exhibit lower loan quality (higher npl) and foreign banks tended to show higher loan quality. The financial liberalization measures appeared to have been effective in improving loan quality among domestic banks, and the change in ownership from domestic to foreign hands was seen to improve loan quality significantly (as shown by FOREIGN in the foreign bank subsample).
Two results pointed to a worsening of loan quality, particularly among domestic banks, from increases in average bank size. Each bank would tend to have a worse loan quality the larger its market share, and its loan quality would also deteriorate as a result of an increase in overall concentration in the banking system (H). Domestic and foreign entry had similar effects on loan quality. Both tended to worsen loan quality among domestic banks and improve loan quality among foreign banks.
It is also interesting to note that while domestic banks were primarily affected by the number rather than the market share entry (i.e., the presence, independently of whether there was effective penetration into the market) of foreign banks, they were affected by the market share entry of domestic banks. In other words, competition for market share with the new domestic banks led to a significant deterioration in loan quality, whereas the mere presence of new foreign banks tended to produce a similar effect.
Finally, the OLS results show some significant differences among types of banks.
New domestic banks tend to have lower loan quality than their established counterparts, but new foreign banks do not differ significantly from established foreign banks. Acquired foreign banks initially exhibit lower loan quality, but acquisition tends to increase it up to about the average level for established foreign banks (i.e., in the regression for foreign banks, the sum of the coefficients on FOR and ACQ is not significantly different from zero).
IV. Conclusions
In our descriptive analysis, we showed how the policy stance towards DFIFS in Colombia had changed over time, becoming increasingly restrictive up until new foreign investment was banned outright in 1975. As a result, foreign investment flows effectively stalled throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, and individual banks were forced to transform themselves into joint-ownership banks with at least 51% domestic ownership. However, these joint-ownership banks tended to behave differently from domestic banks. They operated with higher levels of capitalization and better overall loan quality, and tended to be more profitable over time, weathering better the widespread banking crisis of the early 1980s.
As we discussed earlier, the financial liberalization measures implemented in the early 1990s included a relaxation of entry restrictions which contributed to a flurry of new activity in the sector. In particular, the renewed opening of the market to foreign investment resulted in joint ownership banks quickly becoming acquired fully by foreign investors, new foreign banks established in Colombia, and the acquisition of domestic banks by foreign investors. In addition, several new domestic banks were also created, quickly capturing market share.
The econometric results provide evidence that foreign banks (both joint-ownership banks in the pre-liberalization period and fully foreign-owned banks in the postliberalization) have behaved differently from domestic banks in Colombia. Foreign banks tended to have lower administrative costs and higher loan quality, which resulted in their ability to charge slightly lower intermediation spreads. Furthermore, for the two relevant domestic banks, foreign acquisition appears to have been beneficial, as significant improvements came about in administrative costs and loan quality.
The econometric analysis also shows evidence of benefits from increased entry of both domestic and foreign banks in the Colombian banking system, although some costs of this entry also became evident, particularly among domestic banks. While both types of entry were seen to increase competition, lowering intermediation spreads charged by both domestic and foreign banks, the intensified competition was accompanied by a deterioration in loan quality among domestic banks. Furthermore, while domestic entry tended to cause domestic banks to lower their administrative costs, foreign entry had the opposite effect, possibly by forcing domestic banks to undertake costly technological upgrades. Finally, foreign banks were shown to benefit the most from entry; increased competition tended to drive their spreads and administrative costs down, and their loan quality improved as a result of both types of entry, thus suggesting that these institutions were in a stronger position to compete in the new environment.
As for differences within groups of banks, newly created banks appeared to be at a market disadvantage with respect to their established counterparts (both domestic and foreign), and thus were forced to charge lower spreads in order to gain market share.
Furthermore, loan quality tended to be worse for newly created domestic banks, while administrative costs were roughly the same as for their established counterparts. Finally, as foreign investors acquired domestic banks, they tended to improve the loan quality and lower the administrative costs of the acquired banks.
Three additional findings regarding the effects of the liberalization measures are worth mentioning. First, confirming the results of an earlier study, liberalization appeared to have a positive impact on competition as shown in the intermediation spread equations, over and above the effect of entry per se. Second, also consistent with previous findings, spreads became more sensitive to changes in loan quality, possibly an indication of greater prudence on the part of domestic banks. Third, bank size was seen to have a mixed impact on performance. Although there was evidence of economies of scale, loan quality was also seen to deteriorate as individual market share increased, and as the overall concentration of the market increased.
